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There are at least two ways of evaluating philosophical 
originality. The most obvious is in terms of what a 
philosopher thinks. As well as proposing novel philo­
sophical theses concerning the nature of being or truth 
or knowledge, a philosopher may produce new sorts of 
claim bearing on history, art, morality, politics, and so 
on. Another way of evaluating originality is in terms 
of how a philosopher thinks. There are philosophers 
whose most conspicuous claim to innovation resides 
not so much in what they think but rather in how they 
think. They propose a fundamental change in the way 
philosophy is done – a revolutionary break, a new 
beginning. Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl are 
perhaps the most celebrated examples, but ﬁgures such 
as Frege or Russell also deserve a mention. That their 
putative innovation may, on closer inspection, turn out 
to be pseudo­revolutionary or essentially conservative 
is irrelevant here. What is relevant is their avowed 
ambition to effect a total transformation in philo­
sophical method, to have reconﬁgured both the formal 
means and the substantive aims of philosophizing. 
Thus, the novelty of what they think is less important 
than the newness of how they think. Which is to say 
that any substantive claims philosophers like this make 
about history or nature or art or politics can only be 
appraised in light of the revolutionary innovation they 
purport to have brought about at the level of the form 
of philosophical thinking. 
It will be objected that this is an entirely superﬁcial 
distinction and that the canonical philosophers in 
the European tradition combine both dimensions of 
originality in varying proportions: their work marries 
a greater or lesser degree of formal inventiveness to 
a greater or lesser degree of substantive innovation. 
And of course Hegelians or Deleuzeans will be quick 
to point out that in Hegel or Deleuze we have formal 
invention and substantive innovation bound together 
in perfect equipoise. Heideggerians or Derrideans 
will be equally quick to point out that Heidegger 
or Derrida wed formidable abstract inventiveness to 
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detailed concrete analyses in a way that cannot be 
mapped back onto this clumsy form/content schema. 
Notwithstanding this clumsiness, however, and the 
ease with which exceptions and counter­examples 
can be summoned, this admittedly simplistic schema 
remains useful if only because it provides us with 
a basic frame in terms of which to begin gauging 
the originality of a thinker who has a serious claim 
to being the most important unknown philosopher 
working in Europe today: François Laruelle.1 
What makes Laruelle so singular is that he may 
well be the ﬁrst European philosopher in whose work 
substantive innovation has been wholeheartedly sacri­
ﬁced in the name of total formal invention. This is a 
polite way of saying that, unlike his more illustrious 
peers,2 not only does Laruelle not make novel philo­
sophical claims about being or truth or knowledge; he 
also has nothing much to say about history, ethics, art 
or politics – or at least nothing that would make any 
kind of sense outside the parameters of his own sev­
erely abstract theoretical apparatus. Those deliciously 
‘substantial’ titbits with which it is customary for the 
philosopher to placate the public’s appetite for ‘con­
cretion’ are entirely lacking in his work. ‘Show me 
an example of an example, and I renounce this book’, 
Laruelle once quipped.3 
The truth is that his thought operates at a level of 
abstraction which some will ﬁnd debilitating, others 
exhilarating. Those who believe formal invention 
should be subordinated to substantive innovation will 
undoubtedly ﬁnd Laruelle’s work rebarbative. Those 
who believe that untethering formal invention from 
the constraints of substantive innovation – and thereby 
transforming the latter – remains a philosophically 
worthy challenge, may well ﬁnd Laruelle’s work invigor­
ating. Regardless of the response – whether it be one of 
repulsion or fascination – Laruelle remains indifferent. 
Abstraction is a price he is more than willing to pay 
in exchange for a methodological innovation which 
promises to enlarge the possibilities of conceptual 
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invention far beyond the resources of philosophical 
novelty. 
Thus, Laruelle’s importance can be encapsulated 
in a single claim: the claim to have discovered a new 
way of thinking. By ‘new’, of course, Laruelle means 
‘philosophically unprecedented’. But what Laruelle 
means by ‘philosophically unprecedented’ is not what 
philosophical revolutionaries like Descartes, Kant, 
Hegel or Husserl meant by it. Laruelle prefers heresy 
to revolution. Where philosophical revolution involves 
a reformation of philosophy for the ultimate beneﬁt of 
philosophy itself – and a philosophical stake in what 
philosophy should be doing – heresy involves a use 
of philosophy in the absence of any philosophically 
vested interest in providing a normative deﬁnition of 
philosophy. This is not to say that Laruelle’s heretical 
use of philosophy is anchored in a refusal to deﬁne 
philosophy; were that the case, there would be nothing 
to distinguish it from cynical Rortian pragmatism. 
On the contrary, what makes the Laruellean heresy 
interesting is the way it provides a philosophically dis­
interested – which is to say non­normative – deﬁnition 
of the essence of philosophy. 
Like the revolutionary, the heretic refuses to accept 
any deﬁnition of philosophy rooted in an appeal to 
the authority of philosophical tradition. But unlike 
the revolutionary, who more often than not overturns 
tradition in order to reactivate philosophy’s supposedly 
originary but occluded essence, the heretic proceeds 
on the basis of an indifference which suspends tradi­
tion and establishes a philosophically disinterested 
deﬁnition of philosophy’s essence, or, as Laruelle 
prefers to say, identity. This disinterested identiﬁcation 
of philosophy results in what Laruelle calls a non­
philosophical use of philosophy: a use of philosophy 
that remains constitutively foreign to the norms and 
aims governing the properly philosophical practice of 
philosophy. And in fact, ‘non­philosophy’ is Laruelle’s 
name for the philosophically unprecedented or hereti­
cal practice of philosophy he has invented.
Yet despite its name, this is neither an ‘anti­phil­
osophy’ nor yet another variant on the well­worn 
‘end of philosophy’ theme. It is not the latest variety 
of deconstruction or one more manifestation of post­
philosophical pragmatism. Non-philosophy is a theor-
etical practice of philosophy proceeding by way of 
transcendental axioms and producing theorems which 
are philosophically uninterpretable. ‘Uninterpretable’ 
because Laruelle insists – and reactions to his work 
certainly seem to bear him out – non­philosophy is 
constitutively unintelligible to philosophers, in the same 
way that non­Euclidian geometries are constitutively 
unintelligible to Euclidian geometers.4 Thus, Laruelle 
suggests that the ‘non’ in the expression ‘non­phil­
osophy’ be understood as akin to the ‘non’ in the 
expression ‘non­Euclidian’ geometry: not as a negation 
or denial of philosophy, but as suspending a speciﬁc 
structure (the philosophical equivalent of Euclid’s ﬁfth 
axiom concerning parallels) which Laruelle sees as 
constitutive of the traditional practice of philosophy. 
New possibilities of thought become available once 
that structure has been suspended and non­philosophy 
is an index of those philosophically unenvisageable 
possibilities.
Consequently, if non­philosophy can be contrasted 
to the postmodern pragmatist’s ‘supermarket trolley’ 
approach to philosophy, where the philosophical con­
sumer’s personal predilections provide the sole crite­
rion for choosing between competing philosophies, and 
where the academy now ﬁgures as a sort of intellectual 
superstore, it is not as yet another theoretical novelty 
– the latest fad, the next big thing – but as a means 
of turning the practice of philosophy itself into an 
exercise in perpetual invention. 
How is such a practice possible? Why should it be 
necessary? And what worth does this enlargement of 
possibility for thought have? These are the questions 
we propose to examine in what follows.
Philosophy as decision 
We must begin by considering the ﬁrst of several of 
Laruelle’s controversial claims: that there is a single, 
transhistorical invariant operative in every attempt to 
philosophize, whether it be by Hume or Heidegger, 
Descartes or Derrida. Laruelle calls this invariant ‘the 
philosophical decision’. The structure of decision is a 
formal syntax governing the possibilities of philoso­
phizing. Yet it remains unrecognized by philosophers 
themselves; not through a lack of reﬂexive scrupulous­
ness on their part but precisely because of it. It is 
philosophy’s hyper­reﬂexivity that prevents it from 
identifying its own decisional form. Decision cannot 
be grasped reﬂexively because it is the constitutively 
reﬂexive element of philosophizing. The identiﬁcation 
of decision as essence of philosophizing presupposes a 
non­reﬂexive or (in Laruellese) non-thetic perspective 
on the thetic reﬂexivity which is the very element of 
philosophy. 
This is why non­philosophy is not metaphilosophical 
– philosophy is already metaphilosophical through its 
constitutive reﬂexivity or specularity: every philosophy 
worthy of the name harbours (whether implicitly or 
explicitly) a philosophy of philosophy. Non­philosophy 
is not a philosophy of philosophy but a heterogeneous 
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practice of philosophy; one shorn of the dimension 
of specular reﬂexivity which is intrinsic to decision. 
And once again, since philosophical specularity is a 
function of the structure of decision, the identiﬁcation 
of the decisional structure which conditions that specu­
larity is only possible from a non­specular, which is 
to say non­decisional, perspective on philosophy. But 
in order to understand how this non­philosophical 
perspective is not only possible but already operative 
for the non­philosopher, we have to understand how 
decision operates. 
Decision minimally consists in an act of scis­
sion or separation dividing two terms: a conditioned 
(but not necessarily perceptual or empirical) datum 
and its condition as an a priori (but not necessarily 
rational) faktum, both of which are posited as given 
in and through a synthetic unity wherein condition 
and conditioned, datum and faktum, are conjoined. 
Thus the philosopher posits a structure of articula­
tion which immediately binds and distinguishes the 
conditioned datum – that which is given –  whether 
it be perceptual, phenomenological, linguistic, social 
or historical, and its condition – its givenness – as an 
a priori faktum through which that datum is given: 
for example, sensibility, subjectivity, language, society, 
history. 
What is crucial here is the way in which such a 
structure is immediately independent of, yet inseparable 
from, the two terms which it simultaneously connects 
and differentiates. It is a basically fractional structure 
comprising two differentiated terms and their differ­
ence as a third term that is simultaneously intrinsic 
and extrinsic, immanent and transcendent to those two 
terms. Thus, for any philosophical distinction or dyad, 
such as transcendental/empirical, subject/substance, 
being/beings, différance/presence, the distinction is 
simultaneously intrinsic and immanent to the dis­
tinguished terms and extrinsic and transcendent in 
so far as it is supposed to remain constitutive of 
the difference between the terms themselves. For the 
division is inseparable from a moment of immanent 
indivision guaranteeing the unity­in­differentiation of 
the dyadic coupling. 
The result is a structure wherein the coupling of 
related terms is also their disjoining – for example: 
pure synthesis as that which (dis)joins transcendental 
and empirical (Kant); self­relating negativity as that 
which (dis)joins subject and substance (Hegel); hori­
zonal ekstasis as that which (dis)joins being and beings 
(Heidegger); différance as that which (dis)joins archi­
text and signiﬁed presence (Derrida); ‘indi­differ­
ent/ciation’ as that which (dis)joins virtual and actual 
(Deleuze) – a (dis)joining that remains co­constituted 
by the two terms it is supposed to condition and so 
implicitly contained within both. Because it is posited 
as given in and through the immediate distinction 
between conditioned datum and conditioning faktum 
– the very distinction which it is supposed to constitute 
– this structure presupposes itself as given in and 
through the datum which it constitutes, and posits itself 
as a priori condition, or givenness, in and through the 
faktum which conditions that datum. 
Thus, because the disjoining of condition and 
conditioned is simultaneously extrinsic and intrinsic 
to their joining, all the moments of a philosophical 
decision are self­positing (or auto­positional) and 
self­presupposing (or auto­donational): a conditioned 
datum is given by being posited a priori through some 
conditioning faktum which is in turn only articulated 
as conditioning in so far as it has already been pre­
supposed through that datum, and so on. There is a 
sense in which the structure of decision is circular in 
that it already presupposes itself in whatever phenom­
enon or set of phenomena it articulates. Hence the 
suspicion that philosophy manages to interpret every­
thing while explaining nothing, because the structure 
of the explanans, decision, is already presupposed in 
the explanandum, the phenomenon or phenomena to 
be explained. Yet strictly speaking the structure of 
decision is not so much that of a circle as that of a 
Moebius strip – but one where the twist that joins the 
inner and outer faces of the strip and allows them to 
ﬂow smoothly into one another is also a fracture, scis­
sion or split whose dimensionality is simultaneously 
more and less than, both in excess of and subtracted 
from, the immanent dimensions of the strip’s opposing 
surfaces. 
This fractional loop, this auto­positional and 
auto­donational structure, constitutes philosophy’s 
inherently reﬂexive or specular character. It guar­
antees that everything is potentially philosophizable, 
which is to say, possible grist for the decisional mill. 
Thus, if philosophizing (especially in the ‘continen­
tal’ manner) remains a loose­knit grouping of inter­
pretative strategies rather than a rigorous theoretical 
praxis, it is because decisional specularity ensures 
the world remains philosophy’s mirror. Philosophiz­
ing the world becomes a pretext for philosophy’s own 
interminable self­interpretation. And since interpreta­
tion is a function of talent rather than rigour, the 
plurality of mutually incompatible yet unfalsiﬁable 
interpretations merely perpetuates the uncircum­
scribable ubiquity of philosophy’s auto­encompass­
ing specularity. Absolute specularity breeds inﬁnite 
27R a d i c a l  P h i l o s o p h y  1 2 1  ( S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 )
interpretation – such is the norm for the philosophical 
practice of thought. 
Unilateral duality
Moreover, if everything is philosophizable, that 
which most urgently needs to be philosophized for 
post­Kantian European philosophy is the difference 
between philosophy and its other(s); which is to say, 
the difference between the philosophical and the extra­
philosophical. Continental philosophy lives off this 
difference between itself and its specular, imaginary 
other(s): science, religion, the mystical, the ethical, the 
political, the aesthetic or even – surely a symptom of 
terminal desperation – ‘the ordinary’. It is because 
philosophy enjoys a constitutive relation to the extra­
philosophical, however characterized, that the ‘non’ 
in Laruelle’s ‘non­philosophy’ indexes a suspension of 
philosophy’s all­encompassing specularity, rather than 
a naive attempt to demarcate or delimit it – which 
would merely reiterate the decisional gesture.
Thus, whereas the relation between the philosophical 
and the extra­philosophical is constitutively dialectical 
(where ‘dialectical’ is taken to mean ‘differential’ in 
the broadest possible sense), and since the dialectical 
relationality championed by philosophy is invariably 
one of bilateral reciprocity (following the circular 
logic of decision), the relation between philosophy 
and non­philosophy is one of what Laruelle calls 
‘unilateral duality’ – ‘unilateral duality’ rather than 
just ‘unilaterality’. This is a crucial technical nuance. 
The concept of ‘unilateral duality’ lies at the very 
heart of Laruelle’s non­philosophical enterprise and 
it is important to distinguish it from the notion of 
unilateral relation, which is well known in philosophy: 
X distinguishes itself unilaterally from Y without Y 
distinguishing itself from X in return. Various Neo­
Platonists, Hegel, Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze all 
make (implicit) use of this logic of unilaterality in 
different ways. But in philosophy, the unilaterality of 
X is always reinscribed in a bilateral relation with Y at 
the supplementary meta­level available to the subject 
of philosophy, who enjoys a position of overview vis­à­
vis X and Y and continues to see both terms in relation 
to one another at the same time. Thus, X’s unilaterality 
relative to Y is only operative at the level of X and 
Y, not for the philosopher who exempts himself from 
this immanent relation through transcendence. The 
philosopher is always a spectator who views everything 
(terms and relations) from above. This is what Laruelle 
means by specularity. 
By way of contrast, in the non­philosophical logic 
of unilateral duality, it is the subject of non­philosophy 
(what Laruelle calls ‘the Stranger­subject’) who now 
effectuates the unilateralizing identity of the term Y 
while philosophy instantiates the unilateralized differ­
ence of the term X as it distinguishes itself from Y. Con­
sequently, it is not non­philosophy that distinguishes 
itself unilaterally from philosophy but philosophy that 
distinguishes itself unilaterally from non­philosophy. 
But in non­philosophical thought, the supplementary 
dimension of specular reﬂexivity through which the 
philosopher is able to oversee the relation between X 
and Y is effectively reduced, rendered inoperative, so 
that the unilateral relation between X and Y has itself 
become unilateralized, deprived of its transcendent, 
bilateral circumscription via the subject of philosophy 
and leaving only the unilateralizing identity of Y 
qua subject of non­philosophy and the unilateralized 
difference between X and Y qua philosophy. Y, the 
subject of non-philosophy, is now radically indifferent 
to the difference between X and Y, philosophy and 
non-philosophy. 
This total structure is what Laruelle means by 
unilateral duality: a structure comprising non­rela­
tion (the subject of non­philosophy as unilateralizing 
identity) and the relation of relation and non­relation 
(philosophy as unilateralized difference between X and 
Y). Unlike philosophical unilaterality, which always 
ultimately has two sides, the unilateral duality which 
lies at the heart of non­philosophy is a duality with 
only one side: the side of philosophy as difference 
(relation) between X (relation) and Y (non­relation). 
Accordingly, if the apex of decision’s dialectical specu­
larity consists in articulating the relation between the 
philosophical and extra­philosophical as ‘relation of 
relation and non­relation’, then the unilateral duality 
as non­dialectical ‘relation’ between philosophy and 
non­philosophy has to be understood in terms of ‘the 
non­relation of relation and non­relation’. Once again, 
unlike the philosophical dialectic, non­philosophy 
effectuates a unilateral duality with only one side 
– the side of philosophy as all­encompassing relation­
ality. Since every philosophical decision is always 
two­sided – that is, dialectical – the non­philosophical 
unilateralization of decision cannot be dialectically 
reinscribed. 
The axiomatic suspension of decision
What is innovative about twentieth­century European 
philosophy’s preoccupation with alterity or difference,5 
Laruelle suggests, is its attempt to use the latter as 
a way of acknowledging and mobilizing the struc­
tural blind spot in decision, the moment of absolute 
division as absolute indivision, the fractional surplus 
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or indivisible remainder that (dis)joins decision and 
enables philosophical reﬂexivity while disabling phil­
osophy’s attempt to grasp the non­specular root of 
its own specularity. If twentieth­century European 
philosophy has consistently characterized that condi­
tion as an aporia, caesura or unobjectiﬁable excess 
(e.g. différance, non­identity, Unterschied, event, other, 
real, and so on), it is because it has tried to grasp 
the non­reﬂexive root of reﬂexivity using reﬂexive 
means. Hence the latter’s aporetic or intra­decisional 
characterization as condition of (im)possibility for 
philosophy; as an unnameable traumatic kernel that 
resists or shatters conceptualization. 
For Laruelle, philosophy’s assumption that deci­
sional reﬂexivity is the only available paradigm for 
abstract thought, and that specular abstraction is 
the only possible kind of abstraction, results in this 
aporetic characterization of the non­thetic root of 
decision. Yet a non­specular paradigm of theoretical 
abstraction already exists, Laruelle insists. Moreover, 
it exists precisely in that form of thinking which 
‘continental’ philosophy has consistently belittled 
and demeaned as un­thinking: the axiomatic. Since 
philosophy cannot conceive of a thought operating 
without recourse to the fractured mirror of decision, 
since it equates thinking with inﬁnite specularity and 
interminable interpretation, it cannot imagine any 
thought worthy of the name that would be neither 
specular nor interpretative. Yet axiomatic abstraction 
provides the paradigm for precisely such a thought: 
one which is non­specular, non­reﬂexive. This non­
thetic or immanently performative thought anchors 
itself in the non­reﬂexive root of decision by positing 
it axiomatically as its own enabling condition, rather 
than trying to grasp it decisionally and failing (it 
is this failure which results in the aporetic charac­
terization of decision’s non­thetic root as unthink­
able caesura or obstacle to conceptualization). What 
is an obstacle for decisional conceptualization – an 
obstacle whose quasi­insurmountable status fuels the 
postmodern pathos of terminal exhaustion – provides 
a new basis for axiomatic invention. It is a question of 
positing the non­thetic root of decision axiomatically, 
without presupposing it via decision. Or (which comes 
to the same thing) of presupposing it via an axiom 
rather than positing it via a decision. 
For Laruelle, a thinking of this sort – axiomatic or 
non­philosophical thinking – is not merely possible but 
real, which is to say radically performative (we will 
have more to say about this performativity below). 
Thus, if the ‘non’ in non­philosophy is not a negation 
of philosophical reﬂexivity it is because it indexes a 
thinking for which philosophical decision qua inﬁnite 
reﬂexivity encompassing and integrating its own limits 
has already been suspended through an act of axi-
omatic positing. But what prevents this axiomatic 
suspension of decisional specularity from amounting 
to yet another decisional scission between the philo­
sophical and the extra­philosophical is the fact that it 
is effected on the basis of an immanence which has 
not itself been decided about: an immanence which has 
not been posited and presupposed as given through a 
transcendent act of decision, but axiomatically posited 
as already given, independently of every perceptual or 
intentional presupposition, as well as every gesture of 
ontological or phenomenological position. It is posited 
as already given and as already determining its own 
positing. 
Thus, this non­decisional immanence, which allows 
itself to be posited as already given without decisional 
positing, is an immanence that does not even need 
to be liberated from decisional transcendence: it is 
precisely as that which is already separated (without­
separation) from the decisional co­constitution of given 
and givenness, immanence and transcendence, that 
it conditions its own positing as already given. Con­
sequently, this non­decisional immanence is not the 
Deleuzean plane of immanence, which is at once pre­
supposed as pre­philosophically given and constructed 
or posited as given through the philosophical concept,6 
in accordance with the decisional co­constitution of 
given and givenness, positing and presupposition. 
Where decision renders positing and presupposition 
co­constitutive – the positing of a presupposition and 
the presupposition of the posited (as in Hegel’s exem­
plary analysis of the logic of reﬂection in the Science 
of Logic) – the non­decisional axiom separates them in 
such a way as to render the immanence it has posited 
determining for its own description as already posited 
(without­presupposition). By the same token, the axiom 
renders the immanence it has presupposed determin-
ing for its own description as already presupposed 
(without­positing). 
Consequently, unlike Michel Henry’s phenomen­
ologized version of radical immanence,7 which has to 
absolve itself from reﬂexive specularity in order to count 
as non­thetic, Laruelle’s non­decisional immanence 
is not co­constituted by decision. Non­philosophical 
immanence is foreclosed rather than opposed to deci­
sion – which is to say: radically indifferent to the 
dyadic distinction between positing and presupposing, 
immanence and transcendence, given and givenness, as 
well as to every other decisional dyad. In other words, 
it is radically indifferent to all dyadic couplings of the 
29R a d i c a l  P h i l o s o p h y  1 2 1  ( S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 )
form: thinkable/unthinkable, decidable/undecidable, 
determinable/undeterminable. 
It should now be easier to see why a certain obvious 
philosophical objection to the non­philosophical pos­
iting of radical immanence misses the point. This 
objection, which tries to argue that the axiomatic 
positing of immanence as non­decisional reinscribes 
it in the dyad decision/non­decision, thereby allowing 
it to become co­constituted by decision, is mistaken 
on three counts. 
First, whereas philosophical specularity operates 
by assuming a fundamental reciprocity or revers­
ibility between conceptual description and ontological 
constitution, non­specular or non­philosophical think­
ing does not. It operates on the basis of a radically 
irreversible or unilateral duality between the axiomatic 
positing of immanence and its description as already 
posited. Thus, the non­philosophical characterization 
of radical immanence as already given does not con­
stitute it as given. Radical immanence is ontolog­
ically foreclosed. It remains non­constitutable, not 
because it opposes or resists constitution, but because 
it is indifferent to the dyadic distinction between des­
cription and constitution. It is the already constituted 
determining its own description as constituted. Thus, 
there is no dyadic distinction between the axiomatic 
positing of immanence as given and its description as 
posited. Instead, there is a unilateral duality, which is 
to say a duality with only one side: that of the des­
cription which is determined by the positing without 
determining that positing in return. This unilateral or 
non­decisional duality, whereby what is axiomatically 
given determines its own description as given, guaran­
tees that the non­philosophical description of radical 
immanence as already posited is adequate to it in the 
last instance, without being constitutive of it. Adequa-
tion without correspondence: such is the hallmark 
of truth for a non­philosophical axiomatic shorn of 
the specularity that envelops truth as correspondence, 
coherence or unveiling (aletheia). 
Second, that radical immanence is foreclosed to 
constitution does not mean that it is unconceptual­
izable. On the contrary, it becomes limitlessly con­
ceptualizable on the basis of any given conceptual 
material precisely in so far as it already determines its 
own description as adequate to it in the last instance, 
without any of these conceptual characterizations or 
descriptions becoming co­constitutive or co­determin­
ing for it. Thus, where decisional thinking posits and 
presupposes a reversible equivalence between imma­
nence and its transcendent conceptual characterization, 
non­decisional thinking operates on the basis of an 
irreversible duality between them, so that immanence 
unilaterally determines its own transcendent concep­
tual description, without being determined by it in 
return. 
Third, the separation between the decisional and 
non­decisional is not itself dyadic, which is to say 
decisional. To maintain that is to fail to acknowledge 
that for non­philosophy that separation is axiomatically 
posited as already in effect without recourse to deci­
sion, in accordance with the nature of radical imma­
nence as separate-without-separation and determining 
its own description as already­separate. Accordingly, it 
is imperative that we appreciate the peculiar radicality 
of the manner in which Laruelle’s ‘non’ separates 
the decisional from the non­decisional. It is not two 
distinct ‘things’ that are being separated. If it were, the 
non­philosopher would indeed still be operating within 
the ambit of decision. What this ‘non’ separates is the 
realm of separability in its entirety (decision) from 
the inseparable (immanence) as that which is posited 
as already separated prior to the need for a separat­
ing decision. In other words, the non­philosophical 
positing of immanence as already given axiomatically 
separates decisional separation (scission, distinction, 
differentiation, division, dialectic) from the inseparable 
as that which is already separated, independently of 
any separating decision. 
Of course, it is intrinsic to the character of decisional 
thinking that it cannot acknowledge this axiomatic 
separation between the decisional and the non­deci­
sional as something which is already realized, already 
achieved for non­philosophy. Decisional specularity 
cannot countenance the axiomatic positing of a radi­
cally autonomous, non­specular immanence. However, 
for Laruelle, far from indicating confusion on the part 
of philosophers, this incapacity is symptomatic of 
philosophy’s necessary resistance to non­philosophy. 
Far from being an unfortunate, arbitrary expression of 
philosophical prejudice, this resistance is wholly and 
legitimately necessary. It is structurally intrinsic to 
decision rather than empirically contingent. In other 
words, it is de jure rather than de facto. Decisional 
thinking is programmed to insist that the axiomatic 
positing of immanence amounts to yet another instance 
of decisional division. It is obliged to reduce the axi­
omatic suspension of decision according to immanence 
to an intra­decisional opposition to decision, or an 
anti­decisional annihilation of decision. And rather 
than being a problem or obstacle for non­philosophy, 
this philosophical resistance is precisely what non­
philosophy requires in order to operate. The decisional 
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resistance to radical immanence provides non­phil­
osophy with the occasional cause which it needs in 
order to begin working. It is what initiates non­philo­
sophical thinking in the ﬁrst place. There would be 
no non­philosophy without it. Non­philosophy is the 
conversion of philosophy’s specular resistance to non­
thetic immanence into a form of non­specular thinking 
determined according to that immanence. 
Determination in the last instance
Thus, non­philosophy works with philosophical 
decision. It does not seek to replace or supplant it. 
Philosophical decision is the object of non­phil­
osophy – better still, its material. But it is a matter 
of using decision non­philosophically. Consequently, 
besides positing immanence as ultimately determining 
instance for non­decisional thought, the non­philo­
sophical axiom posits decisional resistance to that 
positing as something which is also already given 
non­decisionally as a determinable material; a contin­
gent occasion that can be determined in accordance 
with immanence’s foreclosure to decision. Following 
an axiomatically given immanence as determining 
instance, the second axiomatically given factor for 
non­philosophy is decisional resistance to immanence 
as determinable occasion. 
Accordingly, non­philosophy is the coordination of 
‘two’ causes: immanence as necessary cause in­the­
last­instance and decisional resistance as occasional 
cause. Non­philosophy is simply the determination 
of the latter by the former: it is the taking into con­
sideration of decisional resistance to immanence as 
an occasional material to be determined in accord­
ance with immanence as cause in­the­last­instance. 
Thus, the minimal but deﬁnitive coordinates for the 
non­philosophical axiomatic are: immanence qua 
radically necessary condition; decisional resistance 
qua occasional cause; and immanence’s determina­
tion of decision as transcendental effectuation of that 
necessary determining condition for that determinable 
material. 
We are now in a position to understand in what 
sense the new way of thinking initiated by Laruelle 
is supposed to be philosophically unprecedented. The 
syntax of non­philosophical thought is that of determi­
nation­in­the­last­instance as unilateral duality whereby 
the non­philosophical subject determines philosophical 
decision. Like much in Laruelle, ‘determination in the 
last instance’ is an expression with an explicit philo­
sophical lineage – in this case, Althusserian. But like 
every other philosophical expression used by Laruelle, 
it has been subjected to non­philosophical transforma­
tion. In Althusser, the philosophical dyad infrastruc­
ture/superstructure entails that the last instance remains 
reciprocally co­constituted by what it determines, in 
accordance with the bilateral logic of decision. For 
Laruelle, however, the last instance is separate­without­
separation from the decisional logic which it unilat­
erally determines. Determination­in­the­last­instance 
consists in the non­philosophical transformation of 
the unitary syntax of decision qua transcendental syn­
thesis or ‘One­of­the­dyad’ into a unilateral duality 
whereby the One (i.e. identity or immanence) now 
unilateralizes the philosophical dyad (i.e. difference 
or transcendence) – not directly, since it is indifferent 
to decision, but through the intermediary of the non­
philosophical subject who has posited immanence as 
determining and decision as determinable. The struc­
ture of the non­philosophical subject is simply that 
of the unilateral duality: a duality with only one side 
– that of decision as transcendent difference between 
the decisional and the non­decisional. The ‘other’, 
non­side of this duality is not immanence, whose 
radical indifference precludes any direct determination 
of philosophy on its part, but the non­philosophical 
subject itself as unilateralizing instance effectuating 
immanence’s indifference. Since philosophical resist­
ance to non­philosophy occasions non­philosophy, the 
non­philosophical subject effectively unilateralizes (or 
‘dualyses’) its own dyadic inscription at the hands of 
philosophical resistance. Non­philosophical thinking 
consists in converting philosophy’s bilateral resistance 
to non­philosophy into a unilateral duality: not the 
unilateral duality of immanence and decision, which 
does not exist since the former is radically indifferent 
to decision, but rather the unilateral duality effectuated 
by the subject of non­philosophy in so far as it is 
now the organon for determining decisional resistance 
according to immanence. 
Obviously, the role played by this non­philosophical 
subject bears little resemblance to that played by the 
philosophical subject. It is no longer the phenomeno­
logical subject, whether the latter be construed in terms 
of intentional consciousness or being­in­the­world. But 
nor is it the subject as caesura, self­relating negativity. 
It is neither the explicitly reﬂexive, self­conscious 
subject, nor the pre­reﬂexive, unconscious subject, 
who is merely the obverse of the latter and therefore 
implicitly enveloped by decisional reﬂexivity. It is 
simply a function: the transcendental function which 
non­philosophy effectuates for philosophy on the basis 
of immanence as real invariant and decision as occa­
sional variable. The subject as transcendental function 
is a radically disembodied, excarnate, non­conscious 
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subject performing a set of quasi­algorithmic opera­
tions upon a philosophical material by determining­it­
in­the­last­instance. These operations involve neither 
interpretation nor reﬂection: they are blind, automatic, 
mechanical, which is to say non­thetic. Consequently, 
the non­philosophical subject is simply an axiomatiz­
ing organon, a transcendental computer, but one which 
Laruelle prefers to characterize as a ‘uni­maton’ rather 
than as an auto­maton.8 This is a subject which has been 
deﬁnitively purged of all its philosophical privileges as 
locus of reﬂection and reduced to the unilateralizing 
structure of determination­in­the­last­instance. Thus, 
for non­philosophy unilateralization is subjectivation 
and subjectivation is determination: the non­philo­
sophical subject determines decision by converting 
the philosophical dyad which provides its material 
support into a theorem that is – at least temporarily 
– philosophically uninterpretable because it cannot 
be dyadically circumscribed or ‘decided’. However, 
unlike deconstruction, where aporia or undecidability 
is unleashed merely in order to effect a destabilization 
of metaphysical conceptuality, the non­philosophical 
subject’s unilateralization of decision has a positive 
and expansive rather than negative and delimiting 
effect on philosophy: a non­philosophical theorem 
ultimately forces philosophy to expand its available 
decisional resources by obliging it to invent a new 
dyad in order to decide – reintegrate – the unilateral 
duality encapsulated in that theorem. 
The non-philosophical identity of theory 
and practice
Determination or unilateralization is not just what 
the subject of non­philosophy does, it is what he/
she is. Performativity is the hallmark of thinking 
in accordance with immanence. It provides the cri­
terion for an important contrast between the self­
sufﬁcient or philosophical practice of philosophy and 
its non­philosophical practice. Philosophy’s specular 
self­sufﬁciency means that the philosophical practice 
of philosophy is not really a theoretical practice but 
rather an empirical activity whose claim to theoretical 
legitimacy is only ever assured through its perform­
ance. Thus, philosophy is a game, the rules of which 
are always effectively guaranteed by virtue of the 
operation through which their stipulation is enacted. 
Moreover, the philosopher reinscribes his/her own 
philosophical activity within the decisional mirroring 
which renders that activity co­constitutive of the real 
at a level that is simultaneously ontic­empirical and 
ontological­transcendental (the decisional hybrid once 
again). More exactly, the syntax of decision enacts or 
performs its own hallucinatory reality in what effec­
tively amounts to an operation of auto­deduction with 
a tripartite structure: decision is at once an empirically 
conditioned enunciation; an enunciated faktum condi­
tioning that enunciation; and ﬁnally the transcendental 
synthesis of enunciated condition and condition of 
enunciation as event of thought. This is the complex 
internal architecture proper to the decisional ‘autos’ 
as self­positing/self­donating circle or doublet.9 
For Laruelle, the trouble with this performative 
dimension of philosophical activity, this decisional 
auto­enactment, lies not in its performativity (far 
from it) but in the way in which the latter invariably 
operates on the basis of an unstated set of constative 
assumptions which themselves only ever become per­
formatively legitimated. In other words, philosophy 
consists in the co­constitution of theory and prac­
tice: it is a theory whose cognitive possibilities are 
compromised through an extraneous set of practical 
exigencies, and a practice whose performative capaci­
ties are hindered by a needlessly restrictive system of 
theoretical assumptions.10 The philosopher, in effect, 
never says what he/she is really doing, nor does what 
he/she is really saying. 
Laruelle objects to this co­constitution of theory 
and practice, constative and performative, on the 
grounds that it needlessly constricts both the possi­
bilities of saying and of doing, of theory and of 
practice. Moreover, simply to afﬁrm the différance 
between theory and practice, constative and perfor­
mative, is complacently to reafﬁrm philosophical 
decision’s embroilment in its own self­presupposing, 
self­perpetuating structure. 
By positing radical immanence as already-per-
formed, as performed­without­performance, the non­
philosophical subject operationalizes the non­decisional 
essence of performativity.11 It releases the identity 
(without synthesis or unity) of theory and practice 
by converting their decisional co­constitution into a 
unilateral duality whereby the subject performatively 
unilateralizes the dyadic synthesis of saying and 
doing. Thus, the non­philosophical subject unleashes 
the radically performative character of theory as well 
as the rigorously cognitive character of practice. Non­
philosophy is at once a theoretical practice and a 
performative theory. Moreover, it is precisely in so far 
as the non­philosopher is already operating accord­
ing to immanence as ‘already­performed’ that he or 
she cannot help but say what he/she does and do as 
he/she says.
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The reality and contingency of non-
philosophy 
Consequently, for Laruelle, non­philosophy is more 
than just a possibility. It is real – more radically real 
than any positivity or effectivity gauged philosophic­
ally in terms of empirical concretion or actuality. The 
question of its possibility is a philosophical one: it 
continues to assume the validity of the philosophical 
problematization of something that is no longer a 
problem for non­philosophy; something that is simply 
out of the question for it – radical immanence as 
the real root of decision and hence as the answer to 
every philosophical question. More speciﬁcally, radical 
immanence is the solution that precedes the possibility 
of decisional problematization. 
Clearly, however, if radical immanence is the 
non­philosophical real, it is no longer the real as 
philosophically characterized in terms of percep­
tion, consciousness, materiality, production, power, 
the social, and so on. Nor is it the real as being, 
différance, Ur-grund, noumenon, thing­in­itself, will­
to­power, self­relating negativity, Unterschied, non­
identity, absolute deterritorialization. Instead, it is 
simply real immanence as utterly empty invariant=X. 
This is an invariant that does not resist philosophy 
but is indifferent to it, and hence can be rendered 
axiomatically determining for thought on the basis of 
any philosophical occasion. It is an invariant whose 
empty transparency does not render it refractory to 
cognition but on the contrary can be axiomatically 
speciﬁed using any philosophical material. 
Thus, the speciﬁcally Laruellean discovery that 
makes non­philosophy effective is that the real is not 
a philosophical problem: it is positively nothing at all. 
And the fact that the real is no longer a problem for 
non­philosophy allows for a change in the way one 
thinks. Instead of proceeding philosophically from 
thought to the real, or using philosophy to think the 
real as difference, or as differing from some other 
philosophical term, one proceeds non­philosophically 
from the real’s immanent identity to philosophy as 
specular transcendence which strives to split, dis­
tinguish or differentiate between the real and some 
other term, and then mirror the world through that 
difference. Instead of using the mirror of philosophy 
to think the transcendence of ‘real’ objects in the 
world, non­philosophy uses the immanence of the 
real to de­specularize those objects which philosophy 
cocoons in its reﬂexive transcendence. It follows that 
the object of non­philosophy is not the real, which is 
never an object, not even an unthinkable one, but the 
philosophical specularization of real objects. 
Yet since non­philosophy only exists as immanent 
axiomatic determination of philosophy’s resistance to 
immanent determination, does this de­speculariza­
tion have any binding force for philosophy as such? 
Could something like a non­philosophical injunction 
to change how one thinks become imperative for 
philosophers?
Laruelle himself would be the ﬁrst to admit that 
there is nothing necessary about non­philosophy. 
There is no obligation for the philosopher to switch 
from the philosophical to the non­philosophical 
posture. Unlike philosophical revolution, whose 
raison d’être stems from a vision of the true tasks 
of philosophy, Laruelle’s axiomatic heresy cannot be 
philosophically legitimated by invoking an intolerable 
shortfall between what philosophy has been doing and 
what it should be doing. While the conceptual preoc­
cupations which – after long and arduous detours 
– led Laruelle to his discovery have a venerable 
philosophical pedigree, they cannot be used to lend 
it an aura of necessity. Thus, from a philosophical 
perspective, the non­philosophical practice of phil­
osophy is neither necessary nor inevitable. Unlike 
Heideggerian/Derridean deconstruction, which lays 
claims to an irrecusable ‘historial’ necessity for itself 
– the uncircumventable necessity of deconstructing 
the history of metaphysics – non­philosophy simply 
remains an aberrant possibility for the philosopher; 
one whose sole criterion of legitimation resides in an 
efﬁcacy which can only be judged according to the 
parameters of the practice itself. Since that practice 
suspends the teleological considerations in terms of 
which the necessity of a move in the space of con­
ceptual possibilities is usually appraised, Laruelle is 
obliged to deny that philosophers are under any kind 
of obligation to accept the pertinence of his discovery 
and begin practising philosophy non­philosophically. 
Interestingly, the very considerations which render 
non­philosophy unproblematically real and immedi­
ately operational for the non­philosopher also ensure 
that it remains at a safe remove, safely ensconced in 
the realm of possibility for the philosopher. Yet the 
question remains: what is non­philosophy for? This 
is a philosophical question, but perhaps one non­phil­
osophy cannot entirely obviate by simply referring 
the questioner to the efﬁciency of non­philosophical 
practice. Since the only philosophical legitimacy non­
philosophy can muster is as an arbitrary possibility, 
and since its non­philosophical validity is out of the 
question – being a simple matter of efﬁciency – is it 
possible to frame the question of the worth of Laru­
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elle’s axiomatic heresy without reinscribing the latter 
within a philosophical teleology? 
Laruelle himself invokes the desirability of 
‘enlarging the possibilities of thought’ as one way 
of legitimating non­philosophy. And he also suggests 
that, despite appearances, philosophy’s privileging of 
thought has always involved subordinating it to some 
extraneous end (ethical, political, aesthetic, and so 
on) while simultaneously reappropriating that end for 
thought, in conformity with the logic of decisional 
co­constitution. Thus, Laruelle seems to imply, thought 
has never been an end in itself for philosophy. Non­
philosophy, by way of contrast, frees thought from 
every end. By curtailing philosophy’s specular narcis­
sism, non­philosophy untethers thought from every 
decisional telos.
Consequently, despite its apparent arbitrariness, 
Laruelle’s axiomatic heresy can lay claim to a valid­
ity for philosophy: the validity of an emancipatory 
gesture as far as the form of thinking itself is con­
cerned.12 ‘Emancipation’, of course, is an eminently 
philosophical motif. But Laruelle invests it with a 
non­philosophical valence: philosophical specularity is 
constrictive because the possibilities of philosophical 
invention, whether formal or substantive, are already 
delimited in advance by philosophy’s decisional syntax. 
But only from a non­philosophical vantage point does 
this constriction become perceptible. Philosophers 
themselves are entirely oblivious to it and more than 
happy to keep spinning variations on the decisional 
theme for centuries to come. If non­specular thinking 
does have a certain binding force for the philosopher 
willing to explore its possibility, it simply consists in 
the impossibility of returning to the circuitous ambit 
of decisional mirroring having once frequented the 
horizonless expanses of mirrorless immanence. 
The price of abstraction
Nevertheless, there will be many for whom the puni­
tive abstraction of Laruelle’s thought is too high a price 
to pay for such scanty rewards. Non­philosophy strikes 
its more generous detractors – that is, those who do 
not simply dismiss it out of hand as incomprehensible 
gobbledegook – as interesting but thoroughly incon­
sequential. Unlike Adorno, Heidegger or Derrida, 
Laruelle does not set out to dismantle metaphysics 
in a way that could be co­opted for the purposes of 
ideological critique. And, unlike Deleuze or Badiou, he 
does not elaborate a new philosophical system capable 
of incorporating a broad spectrum of contemporary 
artistic, scientiﬁc and social phenomena. But what 
is the worth of something that is neither critical nor 
constructive? Has Laruelle not retreated from phil­
osophy into something like a mathematized theology 
of radical immanence? 
The answer to the latter question must, I believe, be 
an emphatic No. Unlike philosophers of immanence 
such as Spinoza and Deleuze, Laruelle does not decide 
in favour of immanence (which means against trans­
cendence) through a philosophical decision which has 
an ethical telos as its ultimate horizon: liberation, 
the achievement of beatitude, the intellectual love 
of God. Although ethics is a philosophical material 
which can be treated non­philosophically, there can 
be no ‘ethics of radical immanence’ and consequently 
no ethics of non­philosophy.13 The very notion of an 
‘ethics of immanence’ is another instance of the way in 
which philosophical decision invariably subordinates 
immanence to a transcendent teleological horizon. But 
Laruelle is no more interested in subordinating radical 
immanence to philosophy than he is in subordinating 
philosophy to radical immanence. Radical immanence 
is simply not the object of non­philosophy. It is not 
even interesting: it is utterly banal, radically trans­
parent. This is what separates Laruelle from Michel 
Henry, whose phenomenology of radical immanence 
entails an ultimately theological disavowal of phil­
osophy. Yet the point, as Laruelle tirelessly repeats, 
is not to abandon philosophy in favour of a thought 
of immanence, but to use immanence to think phil­
osophy. It is the consequences of thinking philosophy 
immanently that are interesting, not thinking imma­
nence philosophically. Thus, unlike philosophies of 
absolute immanence such as those of Spinoza, Deleuze 
or Michel Henry, non­philosophy has nothing to say 
about radical immanence ‘in itself’. What it does have 
something to say about is how immanence provides a 
new basis for practising philosophy. 
Conversely, and in spite of the fact that Laruelle 
has certainly been guilty of encouraging such mis­
interpretations in the past,14 it would be a mistake to 
see in non­philosophy nothing more than an attempt 
to extend the Kantian critique of metaphysics to the 
whole of philosophy. Unlike Kantian critique, the 
non­philosophical suspension of decision is not guided 
by a normative, ethico­juridical telos. Nor can it be 
reduced to some sort of post­Derridean variant on 
deconstruction. Unlike deconstruction, the unilateraliz­
ation of decision involves a positive enlargement of 
the ambit of decision, rather than just an aporetic 
interruption. 
Thus, before hastily dismissing Laruelle’s work as a 
crypto­theological renunciation of philosophy, a hyper­
deconstruction, or even a sterile exercise in meta­philo­
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sophical narcissism, it is important to remember that 
although non­philosophy does not have a goal, it does 
have a function. And although it cannot be legitimated 
in terms of some transcendent teleological horizon, 
non­philosophical practice is for something: it is for 
philosophical decision. Anyone interested in practising 
philosophy should be interested in Laruelle’s incisive 
exposure of what he calls the ‘theoreticist idealism’ 
inherent in the spontaneous philosophical practice of 
philosophical decision. Philosophers, Laruelle insists, 
do not know what they are doing. They are never doing 
what they say or saying what they are doing – even and 
especially when they purport to be able to legitimate 
their philosophical decisions in terms of some ethical, 
political or juridical end. The theoreticist idealism 
inherent in decision is never so subtle and pernicious 
as when it invokes the putative materiality of some 
extra­philosophical instance in order to demonstrate its 
‘pragmatic worth’. To condemn Laruelle for excessive 
abstraction on the grounds that the worth of a phil­
osophy can only be gauged in terms of its concrete, 
extra­philosophical (e.g. ethical, political or juridical) 
effects is to ignore the way in which extra­philo­
sophical concretion invariably involves an idealized 
abstraction that has already been circumscribed by 
decision. 
It may be that Laruelle’s crisp, sharply delineated 
mode of abstraction turns out to be far more concrete 
than those nebulous abstractions which philosophers 
try to pass off as instances of concretion. In other 
words, the criteria for evaluating the worth of non­
philosophy’s function for philosophy are not available 
to philosophers, who know not what they do. In non­
philosophy, radical axiomatic abstraction gives rise, 
not to a system or doctrine inviting assent or dissent, 
but to an immanent methodology whose function for 
philosophy no one is in a position to evaluate as yet. 
Ultimately, then, non­philosophy can only be gauged 
in terms of what it can do. And no one yet knows 
what non­philosophy can or cannot do. 
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Notes
 1. Born in 1937, Laruelle is Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Paris X–Nanterre, where he has taught 
since 1967.
 2. For instance: Althusser, Badiou, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard, Serres. 
 3. Au-delà du principe de pouvoir, Payot, Paris, 1978, 
p. 7.
 4. The radically heterodox character of Laruelle’s thought, 
its sheer unclassiﬁable strangeness, has consistently 
managed to provoke hostility and bewilderment not 
only among the guardians of philosophical orthodoxy 
within the French academy but also among his relatively 
unorthodox philosophical peers. The unfortunate result, 
after a certain degree of intellectual notoriety among the 
Parisian avant­garde of the 1970s, has been a position 
of almost total intellectual isolation. Laruelle continues 
to inspire a peculiar mixture of derision and fear among 
his fellow philosophers. Derision, because his work is 
deemed utterly ‘incomprehensible’. Fear, because those 
same philosophers, who are used to bafﬂing the un­
initiated, ﬁnd their own inability to understand Laruelle 
35R a d i c a l  P h i l o s o p h y  1 2 1  ( S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 )
unsettling. Yet, contrary to what these philosophers main­
tain, there is nothing obscurantist or wilfully esoteric 
about Laruelle’s work. Understanding it is not a matter 
of initiation: it does not entail exhaustive familiarity with 
a corpus of sacred texts replete with all manner of lexical 
trickery or obscure wordplay. The difﬁculty presented 
by Laruelle’s work is entirely objective: it is a matter of 
learning to think in a way that is radically unlike the way 
one has been trained to think if one is a philosopher. And 
having learnt to think non­philosophically, the point is to 
put this technique into practice to see what it is capable 
of producing. Laruelle’s work presents the reader with 
an organon, an instrument which one needs to learn how 
to use so as to be in a position to gauge its potential, not 
a system or world­view whose doctrines invite assent or 
dissent.
 5. For example Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze. Laruelle 
analyses this problematic in Les philosophies de la dif-
férence, PUF, Paris, 1986. 
 6. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 
trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson, Verso, London, 
1994.
 7.  Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. G. 
Etskorn, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1973.
 8. Laruelle sketches a non­philosophical treatment of the 
issue of ‘thinking machines’ in two recent but as yet 
unpublished papers: ‘Théorie uniﬁé de la pensée et du 
calcul’ [‘Uniﬁed Theory of Thought and Computation’] 
and ‘Performance et Performé’ [‘Performance and Per­
formed’]. I should mention here that Laruelle himself 
would probably not endorse what he would see as my 
excessively ‘machinic’ characterization of the non­philo­
sophical subject.
 9. This decisional structure is at work in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s machinic constructivism: the philosophical 
concept’s counter­effectuation of intensive materiality 
is at once extracted from an empirical state of affairs 
through which the philosopher is forced to think and 
transcendentally productive of being qua event. But 
perhaps it is best exempliﬁed by Heidegger, who re­
inscribes the conditions for the genesis of the project 
of fundamental ontology within the structure of funda­
mental ontology itself. Thus, the philosophical project 
delineated in Being and Time encompasses its own 
conditions of possibility, as explicated in Dasein’s shift 
from dispersion in average everydayness to the properly 
meta­physical appropriation of being­unto­death as its 
ownmost potentiality for being. Since it is via the lat­
ter that Dasein’s own being comes into question for it, 
fundamental ontology as theoretical project is ultimately 
supervenient on the existential ur­project delineated in 
being­unto­death. 
 10. ‘Once [philosophy] begins to be used as a material and 
occasion, it becomes shorn of its traditional ﬁnalities, all 
of which are based upon a “spontaneous philosophical 
faith”. The latter forms a circle: it obliges one to practise 
philosophy for reasons that are extrinsic to it, whether 
these be ethical, juridical, scientiﬁc, aesthetic, etc. But 
philosophy then uses these ﬁnalities the better to triumph 
and afﬁrm itself on the basis of their subordination as 
the only activity which is genuinely excellent, uncir­
cumventable or “absolute”. All this prescriptive activity 
– whether it be ethical or pedagogical, etc. –, all this 
normative or auto­normative use of philosophy “with a 
view to experience”; every latent or explicit teleology 
concomitant with the spontaneous practice of philosophy 
must be abandoned, which does not mean destroyed 
but treated as a mere material and practised henceforth 
within these limits’ (Laruelle, Philosophie et non-phi-
losophie, Mardaga, Liège, 1989, p. 27).
 11. ‘It is this Performed, shorn of the fetishes of per­
formativity and of activity and the causa sui in gen­
eral, which invests thinking itself as identity (within its 
relatively autonomous order of thought) of science and 
philosophy, and more generally, of the theoretical and 
the pragmatic. We shall not say too hastily – confusing 
once again thinking with the Real – that this identity is 
performed directly in­One, but that it is performed only 
in the last instance by the One as the Performed itself’ 
(Laruelle, Principes de la non-philosophie, PUF, Paris, 
1996, p. 215). 
 12. A point made by Hughes Choplin in his admirable little 
monograph La non-philosophie de François Laruelle 
(Kimé, Paris 2000).
 13. See, for example, Laruelle’s Éthique de l’Étranger 
(Kimé, Paris, 1999) for precisely such a treatment.
 14. Especially in certain works from Philosophie II such 
as Philosophie et non-philosophie, and En tant qu’un 
(Aubier, Paris, 1991).
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